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Comparing Mandatory Arbitration and Litigation: Access, Process, and Outcomes 
Executive Summary 
 
Analysis of 1256 survey responses from practicing attorneys who represent plaintiff 
employees in litigation and mandatory arbitration cases reveals that: 
 
 Employee win rates are lower in mandatory arbitration cases than in litigation. 
 
 Damage awards to successful plaintiff employees are lower in mandatory arbitration 
cases than in litigation. 
 
 Settlement amounts are lower in mandatory arbitration cases than in litigation. 
 
 The presence of a mandatory arbitration clause reduces the likelihood that the 
attorneys will accept a potential case for representation.  
 
 Plaintiff attorneys viewed mandatory arbitration as having lower fairness, less 
adequate discovery, and are less willing to invest time and resources in a case where 
there is a mandatory arbitration clause.  
 
 Cases brought in mandatory arbitration and litigation are generally similar in terms of 
type of discrimination alleged, adverse employment actions alleged, and defendant 
employer size, suggesting these factors do not explain the differences in outcomes 
between the two forums. 
 
 However contrary to some claims, employees in mandatory arbitration cases tend to 
have higher salaries than those in litigation cases. This suggests that compared to 
litigation mandatory arbitration is not serving as a more effective forum for lower 
income employees to be able to pursue cases. 
 
 The largest administering organization, representing almost half of all mandatory 
arbitration cases, is the American Arbitration Association (AAA). Cases administered 
by JAMS , and Ad hoc cases, with no administering agency, are the next two most 
common categories.  
 
 In most cases, the employer pays 100% of the arbitrator’s fees, but in a substantial 
minority of cases (17%) fees are split between the employer and the employee. 
 
 Summary judgment motions are more common in litigation, but are now also filed in 
almost half of all mandatory arbitration cases, indicating that mandatory arbitration is 
becoming more procedurally complex. We also find that the lower employee win rate 
in mandatory arbitration was present even among cases that did not feature a 
summary judgment motion, indicating that this does not account for the differences in 
employee success rates between mandatory arbitration and litigation.  
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Part 1: Introduction 
 
The rise of mandatory arbitration is a major transformation in how American employees 
and consumers enforce their rights. By cutting off access to the courts with no effective 
possibility of choice, mandatory arbitration pushes employees and consumers into an 
unfamiliar private forum to have their statutory and contractual rights determined. 
Despite the widespread impact of mandatory arbitration, we know remarkably little about 
this new forum, how it operates, and how it compares to litigation in the courts. This 
research project seeks to expand our knowledge of mandatory arbitration, focusing on its 
use in employment cases, comparing it to litigation, and providing critical information 
needed to evaluate public policies addressing its rise.  
 
Mandatory arbitration of employment disputes dates back a little over two decades. The 
key event in its rise was the 1991 Supreme Court decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson 
Lane, 500 U.S. 20 (1991), where the court for the first time held that a claim based on a 
statutory employment right could be subject to arbitration. Although that case specifically 
involved the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, in the following years the courts 
extended this reasoning to apply to the full range of employment statutes, including Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the centerpiece of American employment 
discrimination law. A key to understanding the nature of mandatory arbitration is that it is 
presented to employees as a term and condition of employment on an adhesive, take-it-
or-leave-it basis. As with many other standard conditions of employment established as 
corporate policies, a prospective employee’s only real alternative is to decline to take the 
job, something that few job-seekers are likely to consider doing. In its 2001 decision in 
Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001), the Supreme Court affirmed that mandatory 
arbitration agreements could be included in employment contracts promulgated as 
mandatory terms and conditions. While the ability of mandatory arbitration agreements to 
exclude employees from access to the courts and require submission of all employment 
claims to arbitration is now settled law, the Supreme Court provided an additional 
incentive for employers to use mandatory arbitration in its 2012 decision in AT&T v. 
Concepcion, 489 U.S. 468 (2012), holding that a class action waiver in an arbitration 
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agreement could require that any claim had to be brought individually. Thus mandatory 
arbitration agreements with class waivers can now effectively bar consumers or 
employees from bringing class actions in either arbitration or litigation. 
 
What do we know about mandatory arbitration and its impact? Some existing studies 
have examined samples of employment arbitration cases, usually obtained from the 
American Arbitration Association (AAA), which is currently the largest arbitration 
service provider in the employment area. Although some early studies found relatively 
high employee win rates and damage awards in arbitration, comparable to those in 
litigation, these results were mainly based on arbitration under individually negotiated 
agreements or in the securities industry and involved relatively highly paid individuals.
2
 
More recent studies using larger samples of cases based on mandatory arbitration 
agreements find much lower employee win rates and smaller damage amounts than 
typical in litigation.
3
 Existing studies, however, have not been able to account for 
differences in the types of cases that are heard in arbitration. In particular, previous work 
has not been able to systematically compare outcomes in arbitration and litigation in the 
same study.  
 
In this study, we take a new approach to investigating mandatory arbitration that allows 
us to do a systematic comparison of arbitration and litigation, accounting for key factors 
that differentiate between the types of cases brought in these forums. We do this by 
collecting survey data on a comparable sample of arbitration and litigation cases from 
attorneys involved in those cases. We also investigate the overall experiences of the 
attorneys in representing plaintiff employees in mandatory arbitration and litigation. The 
ability to obtain and finance legal representation is a crucial, yet understudied aspect of 
                                                 
2
 E.g. .  Lisa B. Bingham, “Emerging Due Process Concerns in Employment Arbitration: A Look at Actual 
Cases.” 47(2) Labor Law J. 108 (1996); Lisa B. Bingham, “Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player 
Effect.” 1 Employee Rights and Employment Policy J. 189 (1997); Lewis L. Maltby, “Private Justice: 
Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights.” 30 Columbia Human Rights Law Rev. 29, (1998); Michael 
Delikat and Morris M. Kleiner. 2003. “Comparing Litigation and Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Do 
Plaintiffs Better Vindicate Their Rights in Litigation?” Conflict Management, Vol. V1, Issue 3, pp. 1-11. 
3
 Alexander J.S. Colvin, “Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity Amidst the Sound and 
Fury?” 11(2) Employee Rights and Employment Policy J. 405 (2007); Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical 
Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (2011). 
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the system of enforcement of employment rights. Absent the ability to obtain effective 
representation, employees may be unable to pursue and win cases even where their 
statutory rights have been violated. One of the potential benefits held out for arbitration 
compared to litigation is that it could provide a cheaper, more accessible forum to allow 
employee claims to be heard and adjudicated. It is certainly the case that existing research 
indicates many limitations of the litigation system, particularly the relatively poor 
outcomes obtained by plaintiff employees compared to other litigants.
4
 What we are able 
to investigate empirically in this study is whether mandatory arbitration ameliorates some 
of the limitations of the litigation system or whether it is equally or even more limited in 
its accessibility.  
 
  
                                                 
4
 Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal 
Court, 1 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 429 (2004). 
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Part 2: Methods 
 
A major limitation of past research on mandatory arbitration is that studies examined 
arbitration case outcomes in isolation or with some general comparisons to other studies 
that examined litigation case outcomes. However these studies could not account for 
differences in which cases were taken to arbitration versus litigation, nor did they have 
sufficient information on the characteristics of the cases to be able to control for 
differences in the types of cases being heard in the two forums. Although on aggregate, 
the outcomes for employees appear much less favorable in mandatory arbitration than in 
litigation, it could be argued that these differences were due to selection effects where 
only the stronger cases were heard in litigation, whereas smaller and weaker cases were 
able to obtain a hearing in arbitration.
5
 While it is not clear that selection effects could 
account for the large scale of differences in outcomes between mandatory arbitration and 
litigation, it is important to try to address this issue through alternate research methods. 
 
In this study, we investigate the differences between mandatory arbitration and litigation 
by surveying attorneys who represent plaintiff attorneys in both of these forums. Plaintiff 
attorneys are an underutilized, but important sources of information on how cases are 
processed and resolved in mandatory arbitration and litigation. As key actors in cases 
brought in both mandatory arbitration and litigation, they have direct knowledge of the 
characteristics and outcomes of cases, as well as, crucially, the procedural stages before a 
case gets to an arbitration or a litigation hearing. Plaintiff attorneys are also important 
actors to study in their own right as it is their decisions on whether to accept a potential 
case that determines whether an employee is able to obtain legal representation.  
 
An obvious limitation of surveying plaintiff attorneys is the danger of providing a one-
sided perspective on what is occurring in mandatory arbitration or litigation. While 
recognizing this potential source of bias, we address it in a couple of ways. One is to 
                                                 
5
 See e.g. critiques in: Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Pre-
Dispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559 (2001); 
and David Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher, & Michael Heise, Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: 
A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STANFORD. L. REV. 1557 (2005). 
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focus most of our primary data collection on objective characteristics of cases rather than 
the subjective evaluations of the attorneys. Second, many of our key analyses involve 
comparisons of mandatory arbitration and litigation, using questions where any biasing of 
the responses are likely to be similar across the two forums, so that the comparisons are 
less affected by this potential biasing.  
 
For our survey, we focused on attorneys likely to have experience representing 
employees in both mandatory arbitration and litigation. To do this we surveyed the 
populations of two major professional associations of plaintiff employment attorneys, the 
National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA) and the California Employment 
Lawyers Association (CELA). Both NELA and CELA generously provided access to 
their membership lists for this study. NELA is the largest national association of plaintiff 
attorneys specializing in the employment law area. We also included the CELA 
membership in this study due to the especially widespread use of mandatory arbitration 
activity in the state of California, so as to be able to better capture this phenomenon.  
 
We administered our survey questionnaire in the Fall of 2013 using both web-based and 
paper mailings of the survey. For the web-based administration, potential respondents 
received an initial email requesting their participation with a link to the web-based survey 
instruments, as well as two follow-up reminder emails. We then also sent paper copies of 
the survey to potential respondents through the regular mail, with a follow-up reminder 
mailing again soliciting their participation. This combination of email/web-based and 
traditional hard-copy mailing of the survey produced a total of 1256 responses, 
representing a response rate of 47% of our surveyed population.
6
   
 
  
                                                 
6
 The complete rosters provided by NELA and CELA contain contact information for 2,056 and 976 
member attorneys, respectively.  However, 149 attorneys are members of both organizations and 192 
entries were incomplete, out of date, or otherwise contained invalid contact information. 
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Part 3: Attorney Characteristics 
 
We designed our survey sample to focus on active practitioners representing employee 
plaintiffs. Among our respondents, on average, 70% of their individual practice was 
dedicated to employment law matters, 92% of their employment-related caseloads 
involved representing employees, and they had 18 years of experience practicing 
employment law. The respondents mostly worked as solo practitioners or for relatively 
small law firms as seen in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Number of Attorneys Practicing in the Respondent’s Firm 
 
 
 Our respondents included attorneys from all across the United States. We intentionally 
over-sampled California attorneys in order to be able to more deeply investigate what is 
happening in that state, which has seen particularly widespread adoption of mandatory 
arbitration.  
 
  
73% 
14% 
7% 
4% 
1% 1% 
0-5 
6-10 
11-20 
21-50 
51-100 
More than 100 
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Table 1: Most Common States in which Survey Respondents Practice 
 State Count % of Total 
CA 294 31% 
NY 61 6% 
TX 45 5% 
PA 38 4% 
DC 36 4% 
IL 35 4% 
MO 32 3% 
AR 30 3% 
FL 28 3% 
GA 23 2% 
 
 
The respondents practice in state court, in federal court, before administrative agencies 
and in arbitration. The mixture of where the attorneys practice varies by state, with 
attorneys in some states mostly practicing in state court and in other states mostly in 
federal court. For example, on average attorneys in California filed 74% of their caseload 
in state court, but only 15% in federal court. By contrast in Georgia, attorneys on average 
filed 76% of their caseloads in federal court and only 8% in state court.  
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Part 4: Factors Affecting Ability to Represent Employees 
 
What determines whether an attorney is able to take on a case for an employee who 
comes to him or her seeking representation? Most often regular employees seeking legal 
representation lack the funds to pay hourly fees for an attorney.  This is understandable, 
as attorneys in our sample reported charging an average rate of $398 per hour.
7
 As a 
result, in many cases in order to provide representation the attorney needs to finance the 
case him or herself through a contingency fee arrangement under which the attorney does 
not charge the client hourly fees but instead is paid a percentage of the amount recovered 
in the case. In our sample, on average 75% of the attorneys usually represented 
employees on a contingency fee basis, an additional 17% usually represented clients 
under a contingency fee hybrid where clients paid an upfront cost or reduced hourly rates 
in addition to a percentage of the amount recovered, and 6% usually charged hourly fees. 
 
Figure 2: Fee Arrangements for Financing Representation 
 
 
In order for a contingency fee arrangement to be financially viable for the attorney to 
undertake, the case must present some minimum amount of potentially provable 
                                                 
7
 Many respondents indicated that they charge based on a sliding scale.  In such circumstances, the 
minimum hourly fee was recorded.  Therefore, $398 constitutes the floor for the average hourly rate 
charged by respondent attorneys. 
75% 
17% 
6% 
2% 
Contingent 
Hybrid 
Hourly 
Other 
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damages. We asked the respondents what minimum amount of potential settlement value 
or total damages, including attorney fees, would they need to see in a case to justify 
accepting it. On average, the attorneys indicated that they would need a minimum of 
$58,000 in potential settlement value or damages to justify accepting a case on a non-pro 
bono basis. 
 
Beyond the basic economic calculation, a number of factors go into the process of 
deciding whether to accept a request for representation. We asked the attorneys to rate the 
impact the following factors have on their decision to reject a request for representation 
on a scale of 1 (very unlikely to reject for this reason) to 7 (very likely to reject for this 
reason). 
 
Attorneys are most likely to reject requests for representation where there is no legal 
basis for the claim, where they perceive the potential client to be unreliable or 
untrustworthy, and where the case falls outside their area of expertise.  Average attorney 
responses for these top three factors correspond to a response between “likely to reject for 
this reason” and “very likely to reject for this reason.” Responses to the question of how 
the presence of a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clause affected the likelihood of 
accepting a case averaged a score of 4.25, which corresponds to a response between 
“undecided whether to reject for this reason” and “somewhat likely to reject for this 
reason.” Although not as severe as the negative impact of a lack of legal basis, an 
unreliable client, or a lack of expertise, the presence of arbitration does have a negative 
effect on case selection decisions similar to the effect of a situation where the type of 
claim did not permit recovery of attorney fees.   
 
  
14 
 
Figure 3: Factors Affecting Willingness to Accept Cases for Representation 
 
 
 
Another perspective on the effect arbitration has on employee access to competent 
counsel can be gained by looking at the percentage of representation requests 
employment attorneys accept.  While attorneys accept on average19% of potential clients 
for representation who contact them with disputes to be heard in civil litigation, on 
average they accept only 11% of potential clients who contact them with claims covered 
under a mandatory arbitration clause.  The same relationship is observed in the median 
acceptance rates.  The median and mean rates show that attorney acceptance rates for 
clients headed to arbitration are approximately half the acceptance rates for clients with 
claims to be heard in civil court.  This indicates that attorneys are much more selective 
when deciding whether to take an arbitration case.  Contrary to arbitration’s reputation 
for accessibility, if plaintiffs covered by arbitration clauses have more difficulty securing 
4.25 4.33 
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6.28 
6.64 
  
<---  Less Likely to Reject                                                      More Likely to Reject ---> 
Mandatry arbitration clause Attorney fees not recoverable 
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attorney representation, arbitration restricts, rather than expands, access to institutions of 
justice. 
 
Figure 4: Client Acceptance Rate by Forum 
 
 
11% 
5% 
19% 
10% 
mean median 
Arbitration Litigation 
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Part 5: Attorney Perceptions of Mandatory Arbitration 
 
What do plaintiff attorneys see as the impact of mandatory arbitration clauses on their 
cases? Measured on a scale of 1 (very negative) to 7 (very positive), the attorneys we 
surveyed had a negative view of the impact of a pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clause 
on their willingness to represent a prospective client, their willingness to invest time and 
resources in a case, and their willingness to represent a prospective client on a 
contingency-fee basis. The average responses correspond to a rating between “negative” 
and “somewhat negative.”  
 
Figure 5: Impact of Mandatory Arbitration on Willingness to Accept Cases 
 
 
We also asked the attorneys about how mandatory arbitration affected the likelihood of 
settling a case. They reported on average that mandatory arbitration made them slightly 
more willing to settle a case before a hearing. Interestingly, they also viewed the presence 
of mandatory arbitration as decreasing the willingness of employers to settle the case.  
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Figure 6: Impact of Mandatory Arbitration on Willingness to Settle Case 
 
 
When asked about their perceptions of the impact of mandatory arbitration on different 
aspects of due process  attorneys indicated that they viewed mandatory arbitration as 
having negative effects on adequacy of discovery, fairness of proceedings, and fairness of 
outcomes.  The average response indicating the impact of mandatory arbitration on each 
of these factors was between “negative” and “slightly negative.” 
 
Despite the widely held perception that arbitration is quicker and more efficient than 
traditional litigation, attorneys view the presence of an arbitration clause as having 
between a somewhat negative and no effect on the expediency of proceedings, on 
average.  This unexpected result may be better understood by looking at the entire 
distribution of responses.  Specifically, while 38% of attorneys indicated arbitration has a 
very to somewhat negative effect on the expediency of proceedings, 26% indicated they 
were undecided, and 33% said arbitration has a somewhat to very positive effect.  Of the 
38% of attorneys who responded arbitration has a negative effect, several indicated that 
they are unaware of the existence of arbitration clauses until after they have already filed 
a claim in civil court and then the defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration.  While 
the arbitration proceeding itself may be faster than litigation, because attorneys 
sometimes learn about such clauses late in the process arbitration clauses can have a 
negative impact on the expediency of the entire process.   
4.35 
2.93 
Willingness to settle a case Employer willingness to settle a case 
Scale: 1 (very negative) – 4 (no effect) – 7 (very positive) 
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Figure 7: Perceptions of Due Process in Mandatory Arbitration  
 
 
Additionally, if attorneys had taken an employment discrimination case to verdict or 
award in private arbitration and/or civil litigation, we asked them to what extent they 
agreed they were presented with a well-reasoned decision and given the opportunity to 
present evidence and collect information from the opposing party.  On a scale of 1 
(“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”), along all dimensions attorneys gave higher 
ratings in cases reaching verdict in litigation compared to mandatory arbitration.  The 
lowest average rating of 3.9, corresponding to a response between “somewhat disagree” 
and “undecided,” was recorded in mandatory arbitration in response to the statement: “I 
was presented with a well-reasoned decision (written or oral).”  The largest disparity 
between the two forums is found in attorney responses to the statement: “I was given 
adequate opportunity to collect information from the opposing party (i.e., discovery).”  
From a policy standpoint, this suggests that efforts to improve discovery in arbitration 
should be a priority.  While many scholars have documented differences between the 
forums in the distributive aspects of justice (i.e, win rates and award amounts), this is an 
important finding because it shows that, relative to litigation, mandatory arbitration 
scores worse in perceptions of procedural justice as well. 
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proceeding 
Scale: 1 (very negative) – 4 (no effect) – 7 (very positive) 
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Figure 8: Perceptions of Due Process by Forum 
 
 
Even when restricting to successful cases only (i.e., cases adjudicated in favor of the 
employee), the differences in attorney perceptions of due process remain.  Attorneys 
report a higher score for each individual due process element in litigation compared to 
arbitration.  And like perceptions reported in Figure 7, the greatest disparity between 
attorney perceptions in Figure 8 appears in their responses to the adequacy of discovery.  
Even employment attorneys who successfully argue their case and receive a favorable 
verdict for their client report lower scores for due process metrics in arbitration compared 
to litigation.  
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Figure 9: Perceptions of Due Process by Forum (Successful Plaintiffs Only) 
 
 
Collectively, these results confirm the general impression that attorneys who represent 
plaintiff employees have negative perceptions of mandatory arbitration.  It also shows 
that attorney perceptions of due process are more negative in mandatory arbitration 
compared to litigation even where we control for the attorney’s success in winning the 
case. 
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Part 6: Mandatory Arbitration and Litigation Outcomes 
 
How do the outcomes compare between the mandatory arbitration and litigation cases in 
our sample? We asked the respondents to our survey a series of questions regarding the 
characteristics and outcomes of the most recent case they took to verdict or award in each 
forum, i.e. litigation and mandatory arbitration. To increase comparability across cases, 
we asked the respondents specifically about their most recent employment discrimination 
cases.
8
 
 
The first, and most basic measure of success, is whether there is a finding of liability 
against the employer. Whereas there was a finding in favor of the plaintiff employee in 
62% of the litigation cases, there was a finding in favor of the plaintiff employee in 46% 
of the mandatory arbitration cases. This result confirms past suggestions of a lower 
employee win rate in mandatory arbitration compared to litigation.  
 
Figure 10: Plaintiff Employee Win Rates by Forum 
 
 
                                                 
8
 To further facilitate comparability cases involving class actions and employees as defendants were not 
included in this analysis.  Arbitration cases proceeding under individually-negotiated or voluntary 
agreements were likewise excluded from the present analysis. 
46% 
62% 
Employee Win Rate 
FIGURE 0.0: EMPLOYEE WIN RATE BY FORUM 
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Beyond the initial finding of employer liability, we investigate the amounts of damages 
awarded to successful plaintiff employees in mandatory arbitration compared to 
litigation. We find that successful employees receive on average $362,390 in damages in 
mandatory arbitration compared to an average of $676,688 in damages in litigation.  
 
Figure 11: Average Damage Awards by Forum 
 
 
We also find similar, though smaller, differences in median or typical damage awards 
(i.e. half the damage awards are larger and half smaller than this amount), with a median 
of $174,000 in mandatory arbitration compared to $225,000 in litigation. This smaller 
difference looking at the median compared to the mean indicates that a significant part of 
the difference is that relatively large damage awards are less frequent in mandatory 
arbitration compared to litigation.  This could have important public policy effects if the 
absence of large damage awards weakens the deterrent effects of employment 
discrimination law. 
 
  
$362,390 
$676,688 
Average Award Amount 
FIGURE 0.0: AVERAGE AWARD AMOUNT BY FORUM 
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Figure 12: Median Damage Awards by Forum 
 
 
Another metric to analyze award amounts and plaintiff success is to look at the 
percentage of the claim amount awarded.  For example, it is dubious to describe a 
plaintiff as “successful” if they claim $250,000 in damages but are awarded $100.  
Similarly, looking only at the average size of awards rendered in arbitration and litigation 
may overlook important differences between the amounts of damages claimed.  However, 
as seen in Figure 13, when a case is adjudicated in favor of an employee plaintiff they 
receive on average 55% of their claim amount in arbitration and 82% of their claim 
amount in litigation.  This indicates that, even when controlling for the size of claimed 
damages, employees receive inferior outcomes in arbitration relative to litigation.   
 
  
$174,000 
$225,000 
Median Award Amount 
FIGURE 0.0: MEDIAN AWARD AMOUNT BY FORUM 
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Figure 13: Average Percentage of Claim Amount Awarded by Forum 
  
 
Employee success can also be measured by the size of voluntary settlements reached 
before final adjudication in mandatory arbitration and litigation.  Previous studies have 
shown that settlements are the most common disposition in both forums, yet very little is 
known about the content of settlements in employment discrimination claims.
9
  Attorneys 
were asked to report the number of cases settled within the past 12 months by forum and 
settlement size.  The distributions of settlements across forums are presented in Figure 
14.  In accord with our previous findings on monetary award amounts and percentage of 
claim amount awarded, settlements in mandatory arbitration are, on average, lower than 
those found in cases in state and federal court.  Specifically, 29% of settlements in 
mandatory arbitration were between $1 and $25,000, compared to 15% of settlements in 
federal court and 18% of settlements in state court that were reported to be between $1 
and $25,000.  With respect to large settlements, 23% of settlements in mandatory 
arbitration were above $100,000, whereas 43% and 38% of settlements in federal and 
state court, respectively, settled for over $100,000.  It should also be noted that non-
monetary awards are extremely rare across all forums.   
                                                 
9
 Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal 
Court, 1 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 429 (2004); Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson, & Ryon 
Lancaster, Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization? Employment Discrimination Litigation in 
the Post Civil Rights United States, 7 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175, 188 (2010). 
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Figure 14: Frequency of Settlement Amounts by Forum 
 
 
Reviewing employee win rates, damages, and settlement amounts exposes pronounced 
differences between mandatory arbitration and litigation.  Compared to litigation, 
employee plaintiffs in mandatory arbitration are less likely to settle for high monetary 
amounts, less likely to receive a ruling in their favor at trial, and, when they are 
successful, they receive lower damages measured in absolute monetary values and 
percentage of claim amount awarded.  While additional analyses need to be conducted to 
definitively attribute these differences to the arbitration forum, such uniform differences 
among multiple measures suggests mandatory arbitration provides inferior outcomes for 
employee plaintiffs pursuing employment discrimination claims.    
1% 2% 2% 
15% 
18% 
29% 
16% 18% 
19% 
14% 13% 
16% 
11% 11% 10% 
43% 
38% 
23% 
Federal Court State Court Arbitration 
FIGURE 0.0: SETTLEMENT AMOUNT DISTRIBUTION BY FORUM 
Non Monetary $1 to $25,000 $25,001 to $50,000 
$50,001 to $75,000 $75,001 to $100,000 More than $100,000 
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Part 7: Comparison of Mandatory Arbitration and Litigation Case 
Characteristics 
 
One of the limitations of past research on mandatory arbitration is the lack of systematic 
comparisons of the characteristics of the cases brought in mandatory arbitration to those 
brought in litigation. It could be argued that the differences in outcomes such as those we 
have identified can be explained by differences in the types of cases brought in the two 
forums. We address this in our survey by asking the respondents a series of questions 
about the characteristics of the mandatory arbitration and litigation cases whose outcomes 
were reported in the previous section. In this section, we report the results of these 
comparisons between litigation and mandatory arbitration. 
 
First, we asked attorneys about the legal basis for their most recent employment 
discrimination case in each forum.  The legal basis for discrimination alleged in the two 
forums is relatively similar, with sex being the most common type of discrimination 
alleged followed by retaliation.  There are some small differences, with age 
discrimination alleged in 21% of arbitration cases but only 14% of litigation cases and 
disability discrimination alleged in 17% of arbitration cases but 23% of litigation cases. 
The percentages reported in Figure 15 sum to over 100% because a case can include 
more than one alleged basis for discrimination 
 
Figure 15: Frequency of Alleged Basis for Discrimination by Forum 
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Second, we asked about what types of adverse employment actions are alleged in each 
forum.  As with the alleged basis for discrimination, the percentages in Figure 16 exceed 
100% because a case can allege multiple adverse employment actions. In both litigation 
and mandatory arbitration, the most common type of adverse employment action alleged 
is termination, with harassment as the second most common alleged action.  Allegations 
of discrimination in accommodations, working conditions, promotion, pay and hiring 
appear in roughly equal proportions as well.   
 
Figure 16: Frequency of Adverse Employment Actions by Forum 
 
  
Taken together, the distributions of the types of discrimination and the types of adverse 
employment actions alleged do not indicate any major difference in the characteristics of 
the cases brought in each forum that are likely to explain the inferior outcomes in 
mandatory arbitration compared to litigation reported in Part 6. 
 
Are there differences in other case characteristics between arbitration and litigation?  
With respect to the size of the defendant employer, employees in mandatory arbitration 
and litigation cases on average worked for similar size firms.  While the distributions are 
86% 
72% 
28% 31% 
9% 13% 8% 12% 6% 9% 5% 8% 1% 3% 
10% 10% 
Arbitration Litigation 
FIGURE 0.0: PERCENT OF CASES BY ALLEGED 
DISCRIMINATORY ACTION AND FORUM 
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similar, employment discrimination claimants in arbitration are less likely to have been 
employed by very small employers (those with 1 to 49 employees) and very large 
employers (those with 10,000 or more employees).  One of the arguments advanced to 
explain differences in outcomes between the two forums is that firms adopting mandatory 
arbitration will be larger ones with more sophisticated human resource policies and 
internal grievance procedures that filter out meritorious cases before they turn into legal 
disputes. Our finding of an overall similarity of the size distributions of defendant 
employers in mandatory arbitration and litigation is evidence against this argument.    
 
Figure 17: Size of Defendant Firms by Forum 
 
 
The income levels of plaintiff employees is an important issue to examine, because one 
of the major public policy arguments advanced in favor of mandatory arbitration is that it 
could provide greater accessibility for lower income employees who are unable to bring 
cases through the complex and expensive litigation system. However in contrast to this 
prediction, we find that plaintiffs in mandatory arbitration are more likely to have higher 
income levels than plaintiffs in litigation. As shown in Figure 18, whereas 69% of 
plaintiffs in mandatory arbitration had incomes under $100,000 per year, 84% of 
plaintiffs in litigation had incomes of under $100,000 per year. This suggests that it is 
litigation rather than mandatory arbitration that is the more accessible forum to lower 
10% 10% 
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15% 
17% 
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23% 
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FIGURE 0.0: PERCENTAGE OF CASES BY FIRM SIZE AND FORUM 
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income employees.  Alternatively, perhaps arbitration agreements are more likely to 
cover higher salaried employees.  However, even if this were true, the argument that 
mandatory arbitration expands access to justice to lower income employees remains 
dubious if those that allegedly stand to benefit from arbitration are not covered by 
arbitration clauses.
 
 
 
Figure 18: Percentage of High Income Plaintiffs (over $100,000 salary) by Forum 
  
 
In addition to the characteristics of the plaintiff and defendant, we also asked about the 
arrangements for representation of the employee. In both the litigation and mandatory 
arbitration cases, most cases were handled on a contingency fee rather than an hourly fee 
basis.  Pure contingency arrangements were found in 77% and 74% of the reported 
arbitration and litigation cases, respectively.  Hybrid arrangements, where employees pay 
an upfront cost or reduced hourly charges in addition to a contingency arrangement 
comprised an additional 15% and 18% of arbitration and litigation cases, respectively.  
Finally, employee financed their cases on an hourly basis in 8% of arbitration and 5% of 
litigation cases.  
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Figure 19: Attorney Fee Arrangements for Financing Representation by Forum 
   
 
If mandatory arbitraiton is a forum that is more accessible for lower value cases, we 
might expect to find this reflected in differences in the claim amounts between the two 
forums. However we find that both the average and median claim amounts in mandatory 
arbitration and litigation are almost identical, with an average claim of $377,055 in 
mandatory arbitration compared $367,124 in litigation and a median claim of $250,000 in 
mandatory arbitration compared to $227,500 in litigation. This provides additional strong 
evidence that the types of claims being brought in the two forums are similar and 
differences between the types of claims do not explain the differences in outcomes that 
we find between mandatory arbitration and litigation. 
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Figure 20: Claim Amounts by Forum 
  
 
One often observed difference between litigation and arbitration is the relative frequency 
of summary judgment motions in litigation compared to their rareness in arbitration. Our 
results indicate that summary judgment motions were more common in the litigation 
cases. However, summary judgment motions were surprisingly common in mandatory 
arbitration, being filed in almost half of all cases. This difference between litigation and 
mandatory arbitration appears to have narrowed substantially compared to conventional 
wisdom. 
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Figure 21: Frequency of Summary Judgment Motions by Forum 
 
 
Does this difference in the frequency of summary judgment motions explain the 
differences in outcomes between mandatory arbitration and litigation? In Figure 22, we 
compare the employee win rates by forum in those cases where there was no motion for 
summary judgment. Taking out the potential filtering effect of summary judgment 
motions, we find a slightly more dramatic difference in outcomes with employees doing 
less well in mandatory arbitration compared to litigation. This indicates that the 
differences in outcomes between mandatory arbitration and litigation do not appear to be 
the result of a selection effect arising from differences in summary judgment motion 
incidence between the forums. 
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Figure 22: Employee Win Rate in Cases with No Summary Judgment Motion 
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Part 8: Arbitration Administration 
 
As a private contractual process, arbitration’s characteristics may vary depending on the 
nature of the agreement and the administering organization. We asked a series of 
questions to investigate the characteristics of the arbitration agreements and 
administering organizations. 
 
An initial question we asked concerning the arbitration cases in our sample is whether the 
arbitration clause in question was mandatory versus voluntary or individually negotiated. 
We included this question because rather than being mandatory adhesive contracts, some 
arbitration agreements are bilaterally negotiated by employees with individual bargaining 
power, such as corporate executives. Also, there are some arbitration cases that are the 
product of voluntary, post-dispute agreements to arbitrate. Our results indicate, however, 
that these latter two groups of individually negotiated and voluntary arbitration cases are 
a relatively small proportion of the total number of employment arbitration cases. We 
find that 93% of cases in our sample were the product of mandatory arbitration 
agreements. To focus our analysis on the impact of mandatory arbitration, in our reported 
results, we only looked at these cases that were the product of mandatory arbitration 
agreements, excluding the cases that were the result of individually-negotiated or 
voluntary agreements.
10
  
 
Many arbitration agreements designate an organization to administer the arbitration 
proceedings, including providing a roster of potential arbitrators for selection to arbitrate 
the case. Our results indicate that the most commonly used administering agency is the 
American Arbitration Association (AAA), which administered half of the employment 
arbitration cases in our sample.  The second most common administering agency is 
JAMS.  In some other agreements, the procedure does not designate any administering 
organization and instead the arbitration is conducted on an ad hoc basis. The next most 
common category is this type of ad hoc case where there was no administering agency 
                                                 
10
 In addition to dropping individually-negotiated agreements, we dropped cases where the employer is 
listed as the claimant, cases involving class actions, and cases where the arbitration was conducted by a 
public agency such as the FMCS, FINRA, or US DOL. 
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overseeing the arbitration proceedings. The remaining 15% of cases were administered 
by smaller organizations such as Judicate West, ADR Services, PMA, and others. 
 
Figure 23: Frequency of Administering Organizations  
 
 
 
A much discussed issue about mandatory arbitration procedures is who pays the arbitrator 
fees. In our sample, in the majority of cases, or 82%, the employer paid 100% of the 
arbitrator fees for the case. This result likely reflects the AAA and JAMS having adopted 
a rule in their employment arbitration procedures that the employer is required to pay 
100% of the arbitrator fees in cases brought under mandatory arbitration clauses. 
However it is noteworthy that in 17% of cases the arbitration fees were split. This 
suggests that in a substantial minority of cases, employees continue to pay a portion of 
arbitrator fees, which may serve as a barrier to access. 
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Figure 24: Frequency of Arbitrator Fee Arrangements  
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Part 9: Conclusion 
 
This research project has sought to shine new light on the important and growing, but 
understudied, practice of mandatory arbitration. It breaks new ground by examining the 
experiences of plaintiff attorneys who represent employees in both mandatory arbitration 
and litigation. Our results provide systematic comparisons of the processes and outcomes 
of bringing employment cases in mandatory arbitration and litigation. We find that 
employees overall obtain less favorable outcomes in mandatory arbitration than they do 
in litigation, including lower win rates and smaller damage awards and settlement 
amounts. Our survey results allow us to investigate some of the possible explanations for 
these differences between mandatory arbitration and litigation. Arguments that lower 
employee win rates and damage amounts are due to greater accessibility of mandatory 
arbitration allowing more marginal and lower value cases to be brought by employees are 
not supported by our results. Claim amounts and case characteristics were generally 
similar across the two forums. We also find that attorneys are less likely to accept cases 
for representation where there is a mandatory arbitration clause in place. Further 
undermining the accessibility argument for mandatory arbitration, we find that employees 
in mandatory arbitration cases tend to have higher incomes than do employees in 
litigation cases. This indicates that mandatory arbitration is not serving as a more 
accessible forum for lower income employees.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
Appendix 1: Case Characteristics by Forum 
 
Distribution 
 
Overall Arbitration Litigation 
N 911 275 636 
  100% 30% 70% 
Case Merit       
Mean 5.44 5.51 5.42 
Summary Judgment       
Yes 68% 48% 77% 
No 32% 52% 23% 
Statutory Basis for Claim       
Sex 33% 32% 34% 
Disability 21% 17% 23% 
Race 19% 23% 18% 
Religion 2% 3% 2% 
Age 16% 21% 14% 
National Origin 6% 7% 5% 
FMLA 8% 9% 8% 
Sexual Orientation 1% 2% 1% 
Retaliation 28% 28% 27% 
Alleged Discriminatory Action       
Termination 77% 86% 72% 
Harassment 30% 28% 31% 
Working Conditions 11% 8% 12% 
Accommodations 12% 9% 13% 
Hiring 3% 1% 3% 
Promotion 8% 6% 9% 
Pay 7% 5% 8% 
Other 10% 10% 10% 
Plaintiff Gender       
Female 56% 51% 58% 
Male 44% 49% 42% 
Plaintiff Occupation       
Clerical/Blue Collar 24% 16% 27% 
Service 17% 17% 18% 
Professional 13% 39% 23% 
Manager 29% 20% 15% 
Other 18% 7% 15% 
Plaintiff Race       
African American 19% 17% 20% 
Asian 5% 8% 3% 
Caucasian 60% 58% 61% 
Hispanic 11% 12% 11% 
Other 4% 5% 4% 
Plaintiff Salary       
Less than $100,000 79% 69% 84% 
 $100,000 or more 21% 31% 16% 
Plaintiff Tenure       
< 6 months 6% 3% 7% 
6-11 months 7% 6% 8% 
1-3 years 26% 31% 25% 
> 3 years 60% 60% 60% 
Plaintiff Firm Size       
1 to 49 15% 10% 17% 
50 to 99 11% 10% 11% 
100 to 499 20% 22% 19% 
500 to 999 12% 12% 12% 
1000 to 9,999 25% 30% 23% 
>10,000 17% 15% 18% 
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Appendix 2: Employee Win Rates by Forum and Case 
Characteristics 
  Employee Win Rate 
  Arbitration Litigation 
N 275 636 
    
Overall 46% 62% 
Summary Judgment     
Yes 47% 60% 
No 46% 68% 
Statutory Basis for Claim     
Sex 43% 64% 
Disability 50% 61% 
Race 55% 55% 
Religion 57% 36% 
Age 36% 53% 
National Origin 65% 42% 
FMLA 48% 62% 
Sexual Orientation 67% 71% 
Retaliation 45% 67% 
Alleged Discriminatory Action     
Termination 47% 62% 
Harassment 50% 69% 
Working Conditions 78% 58% 
Accommodations 42% 60% 
Hiring 33% 48% 
Promotion 47% 56% 
Pay 57% 63% 
Other 68% 60% 
Plaintiff Gender     
Male 49% 62% 
Female 43% 62% 
Plaintiff Occupation     
Clerical/Blue Collar 45% 67% 
Service 43% 58% 
Professional 47% 60% 
Manager 40% 60% 
Other 63% 60% 
Plaintiff Race     
African American 52% 57% 
Asian 52% 65% 
Caucasian 46% 63% 
Hispanic 24% 64% 
Other 62% 39% 
Plaintiff Salary     
< $100,000 48% 63% 
> $100,001 43% 58% 
Plaintiff Tenure     
< 6 months 25% 67% 
6-11 months 33% 62% 
1-3 years 51% 64% 
> 3 years 44% 60% 
Plaintiff Firm Size     
1 to 49 40% 71% 
50 to 99 64% 71% 
100 to 499 44% 49% 
500 to 999 33% 63% 
1000 to 9999 49% 62% 
>10,000 48% 62% 
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Appendix 3: Award Amounts in Successful Cases by Forum and 
Case Characteristics 
  Monetary Award 
  Arbitration Litigation 
N 114 355 
  Mean Median Mean Median 
Overall $362,390 $174,000 $676,688 $225,000 
Summary Judgment         
Yes $289,452 $172,000 $695,515 $250,000 
No $428,033 $187,500 $630,955 $144,000 
Statutory Basis for Claim         
Sex $394,646 $150,000 $680,688 $200,000 
Disability $326,389 $167,500 $516,059 $200,000 
Race $229,417 $174,000 $719,450 $300,000 
Religion $156,000 $156,000 $2,660,000 $2,660,000 
Age $622,421 $350,000 $584,574 $323,000 
National Origin $245,085 $205,000 $498,333 $433,500 
FMLA $112,091 $117,000 $558,167 $171,000 
Sexual Orientation $514,000 $165,500 $748,000 $250,000 
Retaliation $280,769 $175,000 $789,793 $330,000 
Alleged Discriminatory Action         
Termination $374,514 $185,000 $689,898 $250,000 
Harassment $324,512 $165,000 $946,872 $280,000 
Working Conditions $304,667 $200,000 $538,320 $320,000 
Accommodations $425,800 $131,000 $756,671 $210,000 
Hiring   
 
$474,650 $165,000 
Promotion $538,571 $400,000 $789,768 $335,000 
Pay $251,667 $203,000 $704,048 $210,000 
Other $316,917 $187,500 $510,695 $250,000 
Plaintiff Gender         
Male $393,929 $192,500 $781,102 $300,000 
Female $329,724 $172,000 $603,747 $175,000 
Plaintiff Occupation         
Clerical/Blue Collar $149,194 $121,000 $488,271 $164,000 
Service $634,650 $167,000 $1,101,901 $295,000 
Professional $341,200 $150,000 $678,082 $200,000 
Manager $431,294 $300,000 $868,380 $377,500 
Other $134,941 $80,000 $451,937 $150,000 
Plaintiff Race         
African American $251,001 $172,000  $685,746   $217,500  
Asian $428,050 $275,000  $625,583   $237,500  
Caucasian $433,906 $175,000  $744,114   $230,000  
Hispanic $258,875 $192,500  $ 444,548   $212,000  
Other $150,625 $118,500  $ 154,714   $110,000  
Plaintiff Salary         
< $100,000 $250,297 $150,000 $557,774 $200,000 
> $100,001 $649,626 $394,500 $1,339,522 $675,000 
Plaintiff Tenure         
< 6 months $212,500 $212,500 $354,817 $150,000 
6-11 months $158,000 $77,000 $285,613 $200,000 
1-3 years $325,859 $150,000 $720,193 $165,500 
> 3 years $412,483 $185,000 $754,086 $300,000 
Plaintiff Firm Size         
1 to 49 $333,300 $325,000 $418,103 $125,000 
50 to 99 $191,258 $117,000 $309,859 $200,000 
100 to 499 $353,182 $195,000 $435,087 $237,500 
500 to 999 $160,550 $167,500 $870,387 $442,000 
1000 to 9999 $383,286 $200,000 $857,319 $225,000 
>10,000 $486,184 $152,000 $1,140,599 $643,500 
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Appendix 4: Percentage of Claim Amount Awarded in Successful 
Cases by Forum and Case Characteristics 
  % of claim Awarded 
  Arbitration Litigation 
N 69 174 
  Mean Median Mean Median 
Overall 55% 43% 82% 75% 
Summary Judgment         
Yes 51% 36% 79% 70% 
No 58% 50% 90% 100% 
Statutory Basis for Claim         
Sex 58% 45% 71% 60% 
Disability 40% 35% 80% 75% 
Race 43% 28% 86% 80% 
Religion 41% 41% 67% 67% 
Age 52% 43% 74% 68% 
National Origin 29% 28% 90% 75% 
FMLA 63% 69% 70% 63% 
Sexual Orientation 160% 160% 88% 100% 
Retaliation 59% 48% 92% 92% 
Alleged Discriminatory Action         
Termination 52% 38% 84% 80% 
Harassment 46% 33% 74% 60% 
Working Conditions 52% 17% 67% 62% 
Accommodations 43% 51% 65% 50% 
Hiring     104% 120% 
Promotion 119% 160% 76% 69% 
Pay 34% 32% 77% 89% 
Other 87% 86% 66% 54% 
Plaintiff Gender         
Male 47% 33% 77% 73% 
Female 63% 60% 85% 78% 
Plaintiff Occupation         
Clerical/Blue Collar 39% 28% 82% 69% 
Service 55% 54% 94% 100% 
Professional 89% 100% 89% 67% 
Manager 55% 47% 84% 76% 
Other 46% 43% 66% 63% 
Plaintiff Race         
African American 66% 38% 86% 93% 
Asian 49% 32% 155% 188% 
Caucasian 59% 53% 77% 71% 
Hispanic 37% 30% 80% 80% 
Other 19% 19% 18% 18% 
Plaintiff Salary         
< $100,000 53% 43% 82% 75% 
> $100,001 59% 43% 78% 75% 
Plaintiff Tenure         
< 6 months 21% 21% 79% 89% 
6-11 months 16% 16% 77% 70% 
1-3 years 51% 36% 74% 64% 
> 3 years 59% 50% 86% 85% 
Plaintiff Firm Size         
1 to 49 91% 81% 80% 70% 
50 to 99 52% 38% 92% 92% 
100 to 499 48% 36% 96% 88% 
500 to 999 64% 100% 99% 100% 
1000 to 9999 58% 50% 61% 60% 
>10,000 40% 33% 73% 65% 
 
